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Abstract
In trying to capture complete within-household heterogeneity, household
panel surveys typically try to interview all adult household members.
Following from this, such surveys tend to suffer from partial unit nonre-
sponse (PUNR), that is, the nonresponse of at least one member of an
otherwise participating household, most likely yielding an underestimation of
aggregate household income. Using data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP), the authors evaluate four different strategies to deal with this
phenomenon: (a) ignorance, that is, assuming the missing individual’s income
to be zero; (b) adjustment of the equivalence scale to account for differences
in household size and composition; (c) elimination of all households observed
to suffer PUNR and reweighting of households observed to be at risk of but
not affected by PUNR; and (d) longitudinal imputation of the missing income
components. The aim of this article is to show how the choice of technique
affects substantive results in inequality research. The authors find indications
of substantial bias on income inequality and poverty as well as on income
mobility.
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Motivation
One of the standard assumptions of welfare economics is that individuals
living together in a ‘‘needs unit’’—usually a private household—pool and
share all their available resources. This approach, which is generally
accepted in the inequality research, is not just a means of adapting to data
limitations: It is based on the idea that household members seek to achieve a
common and equal standard of living (e.g., Canberra Group 2001; Atkinson
and Bourguignon 2000; Smeeding and Weinberg 2001).1 This requires that
all incomes received in a given household are aggregated across all mem-
bers and that the total sum is distributed among all of them. Typically, an
equivalence scale is then applied to adjust for differences in household com-
position and size, thus allowing for economies of scale in larger households
as well as variation in needs across age groups (see, e.g., Buhmann et al.
1988). This approach crucially depends on either one household representa-
tive (e.g., the household head) providing complete proxy information on
behalf of all members (similar to the approach used in the U.S. Panel Study
of Income Dynamics, which was started in 1968) or, as is common in almost
all household panel surveys started thereafter, all adult household members
actually providing an interview themselves. Various sorts of nonresponse
behavior appear in most of these surveys, however, posing a serious threat
to the implicit assumption of (representative) full coverage of all the
resources and needs of individuals living together in the household.2 In such
cases, unit nonresponse (UNR, i.e., the nonresponse of an entire household)
is addressed by means of proportionally weighting successfully surveyed
observations, while item nonresponse (INR) is corrected for by either
weighting or imputation. But there remains the problem of partial unit non-
response (PUNR) in those households where at least one member does not
participate while other members do. In fact, there appears to be a generally
increasing percentage of households affected by PUNR in population sur-
veys. Ignorance of this phenomenon may give rise to several problems:
(a) misreporting income aggregates; (b) increasing bias in results on income
inequality, poverty, and mobility, and (c) bias in analyses on the intrahouse-
hold distribution.
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In the literature on social welfare, various approaches have been proposed
for dealing with this phenomenon in the generation of ‘‘equivalent house-
hold income,’’ the outcome variable relevant for inequality and poverty
analysis: First is ignoring the fact that a household member (and his or her
income information) is missing, thus assuming the nonresponding individu-
al’s income is zero. This does not rule out that the person is living entirely
from household-based transfers (public and private), which can be assumed
to be measured correctly and comprehensively based on the information pro-
vided by other household members. Second is adjusting the calculation of
the equivalence scale to ignore the person’s share in household needs to
compensate for his or her missing income. This approach implicitly assumes
that the incomes of other household members are independent of the income
of the missing individual. Third is eliminating all households observed with
PUNR from the analysis population, thus assuming that there are no sys-
tematic differences between them and completely surveyed households, that
is, that the underlying missing process is completely at random. An exten-
sion of this approach would try to compensate for potential selectivity by
means of weighting. This can be accomplished by proportionally increasing
the share of those at risk of but not affected by PUNR. That is, for all house-
holds that are not at risk of PUNR because there is only one adult respon-
dent, the weighting factor remains unchanged. Obviously, this weighting
strategy can be more or less complex depending on the case at hand. Last is
imputing the missing income components at the individual level and aggre-
gating across all household members (including those with PUNR).
At first glance, the assumptions of the first three options are very strong
given the (likely) selectivity issues involved in the missing mechanism. The
third (with reweighting) and final option appear to be less selective, and, in
principle, the last option has the additional advantage of maintaining the
entire survey population. Having said that, there is quite some normativity
involved in the actual implementation of any such imputation process, as is
true in any case of imputation. For example, one may argue that the degree
of misspecification is actually a general underreporting that can be corrected
for by either adjusting the household income by means of a ‘‘(relative) fac-
tor’’ or by adding an ‘‘(absolute) flat sum.’’ More appropriately, one may
allow for more variation with respect to the contribution of various income
components to the overall household income measure and by controlling for
household and individual characteristics related to the missing mechanism.
For example, the severity of misreporting is probably very different for a
household where data on the 85-year-old mother of the household head is
missing because of lingering illness than for a household where the main
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income earner is absent because he or she is drilling for oil on an offshore
platform.
The results from research on equivalent household income inequality
and especially on relative poverty may crucially depend on the choice of
the aforementioned option because this decision will affect the income of
all individuals living in households affected by PUNR and the relative pov-
erty line to be derived from the national mean or median income. Having
said that, any bias in cross-sectional income measures will also affect mobi-
lity analyses based on those measures.
Using more than 20 waves of micro data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), this article assesses how approaches to PUNR can
potentially affect income inequality, income poverty, and mobility. The arti-
cle is set up as follows: In the second section, we first describe the inci-
dence of and trends in PUNR in the SOEP over the period 1984 to 2007,
before turning to the analysis of selectivity of PUNR. Here we control for
the relevance of concurrent household characteristics (e.g., size and compo-
sition) and for individual characteristics of the missing person. The third
section presents the various techniques for dealing with PUNR, focusing on
the principles of our three-stage imputation strategy for income components
at the individual level. In the fourth section, we provide sensitivity analyses
showing the variation in the results for income inequality and poverty when
choosing among the aforementioned options. Making explicit use of the
panel nature of the underlying data, we also demonstrate the importance of
PUNR (and how it is treated in the micro data) for poverty dynamics and
income mobility. Here, our findings show that dynamics are exaggerated if
PUNR is present in at least one wave. The fifth section concludes with some
remarks on the potential relevance of our findings for cross-national com-
parability of research on income inequality, poverty, and mobility.
Incidence and Selectivity of PUNR in the SOEP
The Data
The SOEP is a representative longitudinal survey of individuals living in pri-
vate households in Germany (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007). The survey
was started in 1984 in West Germany and was extended to East Germany in
June 1990, somewhat more than half a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The initial sample included more than 12,000 respondents, with everyone
aged 17 and older in sample households being interviewed. In recent years,
several representative new subsamples have been drawn, which have
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approximately doubled the initial sample size. Other additional samples
were explicitly designed to sample specific subgroups of the population. In
1995, the SOEP introduced an oversampling of immigrants to cope with the
misrepresentation of recent immigrants in ongoing panel surveys. In 2002,
to overcome the problem of a lack of information on ‘‘rich’’ individuals in
representative population surveys—an important group for welfare analyses
given the high concentration of economic resources (income and wealth) at
the top of the distribution—the SOEP introduced a high-income sample
overrepresenting the top 3 percent of the income distribution. The sample
analyzed below employs all available observation years up to survey year
2007.
One of the main problems population surveys face when asking for (spe-
cific) income and wealth information is nonresponse, and SOEP is no excep-
tion. To make effective use of the panel nature of SOEP, all cases of INR
are corrected for using longitudinal row-and-column imputation procedures
(see Little and Su 1989) and purely cross-sectional imputation techniques if
longitudinal information is lacking. Thus, at least potential biases arising
from the aforementioned selectivity can be reduced (see Frick and Grabka
2005).3
Incidence and Selectivity of PUNR
Incidence of PUNR at the person versus household level. There are at least
two ways to express the overall incidence of PUNR in a household panel
survey. For example, while ‘‘only’’ 5.4 percent of all adult household mem-
bers did not fill in the requested questionnaire themselves in 2005, their non-
participation behavior affected the measurement of relevant outcomes for
all other members of their respective households as well. Thus, 11.5 percent
of all individuals (including children who not yet reached the respondent
age of 17) lived in a household that was affected by PUNR.
Figure 1 presents time series information on the incidence of PUNR in
the SOEP data over the period 1984 through 2007. While there was almost
no PUNR in the starting wave 1984, there has been a clear tendency toward
a growing percentage of nonparticipating respondents since then.4 This pro-
cess is even more striking given the secular trend toward smaller house-
holds: The population at risk of PUNR is actually shrinking because of the
increasing share of singles and lone parents in the population (with minor
children up to 17 years of age, the respondent age in SOEP), that is, house-
hold types for which nonresponse of the only respondent living in that
household by definition yields a complete dropout (= UNR). Of course, the
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increase in the incidence of PUNR is also driven by the accumulation of
‘‘old’’ PUNRs over time, that is, persons who basically never give personal
interviews while other household members continue to do so.
Incidence of PUNR by household size. Following from this, a straightfor-
ward way to identify potential selectivity in PUNR comes with the number
of adults (= target respondents) living in a given household. Obviously,
those households with only one respondent do not bear the risk of PUNR.
The risk of the household unit being affected by PUNR, however, clearly
increases with the number of respondents; thus, a household of six is more
likely to be affected by PUNR than a household of only two adults. While
children younger than respondent age do not bear the risk of PUNR them-
selves, they may be affected by PUNR of adult household members: Any
misrepresentation of the adults’ resources in the household aggregate will
affect measures of child poverty.
Figure 2 clearly illustrates this effect by indicating consistently increas-
ing shares of individuals affected by PUNR, either directly (because of their
own nonparticipation) or indirectly (because of nonresponding coresidents):
In 2005, for example, the share of individuals affected by PUNR within the
household context is around 10 percent in households with two persons of
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Figure 1. Incidence of PUNR in the German SOEP, 1984-2007
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)v24, authors’ calculations.
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respondent age, about 17 percent in households with three respondents, and
greater than 20 percent for the rather few observations in large households
of four and more adults.
Incidence of PUNR by panel experience. For a long-running household
panel such as SOEP, any nonresponse behavior is crucial for maintaining
the quality and representativeness of the longitudinal data. The research on
the scope and selectivity of UNR in household panel studies provides rather
robust evidence that the probability of dropping out decreases with panel
experience; thus, any additional interviews reduce the probability of UNR
(see, e.g., Watson and Wooden 2009 on the Australian Household, Income
and Labour Dynamics in Australia [HILDA] Survey). Although there is
clear empirical support for this hypothesis on UNR in the SOEP data (on
the weighting scheme in SOEP, see Kroh and Spiess 2007), the probability
of PUNR does not necessarily monotonically decrease for long-term respon-
dents (see Figure 3). We find a clear reduction in this probability only over
the first few years of panel experience (including the years of childhood that
a person spent ‘‘growing up’’ in the survey without being a respondent him-
self or herself) and again after approximately 20 years.
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Figure 2. Incidence of PUNR by number of adult household members
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)v24, authors’ calculations.
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It may be that a respondent in an otherwise cooperative household is
simply more likely to drop out temporarily in a period of 20 years than in
just 5 years. As such, a temporary dropout of a long-term respondent may
be less problematic than that of a short-term respondent, that is, it may
reduce the number of observations in a balanced panel sample, thus reduc-
ing efficiency. However, an alternative hypothesis that is not tested in this
article could be that the established relationship between interviewer and
respondent for long-term panel members makes these individuals more
likely not to participate in times when ‘‘unusual’’ events occur, that is,
occurrences that they are embarrassed to tell the interviewer about (e.g., a
successful manager’s job loss). This second hypothesis is more in line with
findings by Kapteyn et al. (2006), who argue that attritors in the Health and
Retirement Survey who are recruited back into the survey are very different
from permanent attritors.
Selectivity of PUNR. To control for potential selectivity of PUNR, we
make use of multivariate analyses. Table 1 shows results from a pooled pro-
bit regression model based on more than 45,000 individuals observed in the
SOEP during the period 1985 to 2007. This totals more than 325,000
person-year observations; thus, we use robust standard errors obtained from
clustering at the level of individuals.
PUNRs (in % of all adult hh-members) by no. of years in SOEP 
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Figure 3. Incidence of PUNR by panel duration
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)v24, authors’ calculations.
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Women tend to have a lower probability of PUNR, which is also true
for the middle aged (25–40) and elderly (66 years and older). Similarly,
home ownership, an increasing number of dependent children, and
increasing levels of education are negatively related to PUNR. Compared
to the head of household, we find spouses or partners, children, and any
Table 1. Probability of PUNR—Results From a Pooled Probit Regression
Coeff. Std. err.
Sex Female –0.443 *** 0.022
Age groups (ref: 56–65 years
of age)
17–24 –0.003 0.024
25–40 –0.053 * 0.024
41–55 –0.210 *** 0.033
66 and older –0.304 *** 0.036
Relation to household head
(ref: household head)
Partner 0.977 *** 0.025
Child 0.984 *** 0.036
Other 1.700 *** 0.049
Migration background (ref:
autochthonous)
Native-born foreigners 0.204 *** 0.045
Foreign-born Germans –0.264 *** 0.045
Foreign-born foreigners –0.347 *** 0.037
Region (ref: West Germany) East Germany –0.245 *** 0.025
Change in household
composition (ref: no
change)
Change 0.076 *** 0.016
First household interview 0.528 *** 0.015
No. of adults in household
(ref: 2)
3 adults 0.052 * 0.023
4 + adults 0.125 *** 0.028
No. of children in household
(ref: none)
1 child –0.078 *** 0.023
2 children –0.163 *** 0.026
3 + children –0.170 *** 0.032
Home owner (ref: tenant) Home owner –0.051 ** 0.019
Highest education of hh
head/partner (ref:
intermediate)
Lower secondary 0.039 0.034
Higher secondary –0.102 *** 0.023
Tertiary –0.124 *** 0.026
Item nonresponse monthly
household income (ref: no)
Yes 0.396 *** 0.025
Control dummies for survey
year
Yes
Constant –1.779 0.034
Pseudo-R2 .1568
Observations 325,414
Individuals 45,038
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, 1985–2007)v24, authors’ calculations.
Robust standard errors.
* Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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other household members to be more likely to show PUNR. The probabil-
ity of PUNR is particularly high at the time of a given household’s first
interview and increases when changes in household composition occur.
As expected, the risk of individual nonparticipation increases with the
number of adults to be interviewed. We also find significant evidence that
INR on the question dealing with current monthly household income is
related to PUNR of at least one household member. This is also in line
with findings based on data from various panel surveys showing a posi-
tive impact of INR on income questions in wave t on the probability of
UNR (i.e., attrition) in wave t + 1 (see, e.g., Loosveldt, Pickery, and
Billiet 2002; Frick and Grabka 2010). These findings may be taken as
indications that economically active household members are more com-
mon among PUNR, and thus probably major contributions to overall
household resources are understated.
Summing up, there is mixed evidence on the mechanisms driving
PUNR. On one hand, long-term participation in panel surveys increases
the risk of (temporary) PUNR, which could be completely random
(CMAR) or at least random with respect to the income information
(MAR). On the other hand, it is also likely that temporary nonresponse is
caused by life events that affect individual income, for example, unem-
ployment or sickness (NMAR). Thus, any approach of dealing with
PUNR in income-based analyses should be capable of addressing the
whole range of nonresponse mechanisms.
Dealing With PUNR in Income-Based Analyses of
Economic Well-Being
Keeping the aforementioned selection issues in mind, the following section
starts by briefly introducing the various approaches to dealing with PUNR
before demonstrating prototypical empirical applications from a welfare
economics perspective using an aggregated measure of equivalent house-
hold income.
Alternative Approaches
There exist a variety of ways to deal with PUNR in empirical analyses, four
of which are applied in this article: (a) ignorance, that is, assuming the miss-
ing individual’s income to be zero; (b) adjustment of the equivalence scale
to account for differences in household size and composition; (c) elimination
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of all households observed with PUNR using subsequent reweighting proce-
dures; and (d) longitudinal imputation of the missing income components.
 Ignorance: Assume the individual affected by PUNR has no income
of his or her own to add to the household’s overall resources, but he
or she does have needs that ought to be considered when constructing
the household’s equivalence scale. This means effectively ignoring
PUNR in the measure of household income, while continuing to con-
sider his or her needs, that is, Y(PUNR) = 0 & Needs(PUNR). 0.
 Adjustment: Assume the individual has no income of his or her own
as well as no needs and thus completely ignore the existence of the
individual with PUNR. This effectively means deleting nonresponding
individuals from PUNR households by adjusting the respective equiva-
lent scale downward, that is, Y(PUNR) = 0 & Needs(PUNR) = 0, which
implies that income and needs of the missing individual are identical to
those of the observed household members.
 Elimination: Delete all individuals living in households affected by
PUNR (i.e., also the successfully interviewed persons) and rescale
the population weights for those households that bear a risk of PUNR
but did fully complete the survey. This assumes that the income and
needs of households with PUNR are mirrored by successfully com-
pleted households with two and more respondents.5
 Imputation: Impute any income measure missing because of PUNR,
thus considering all households with completed information on
income as well as needs by assigning incomes to PUNRs on the basis
of comprehensive (cross-sectional and longitudinal) imputation pro-
cedures (details are given in the next section below).
 Finally, there is another approach that is not considered in the
remainder of this article: the flat ‘‘correction factor,’’ which has been
applied in the European Community Household Panel (ECHP; see
Eurostat 2000).6 In this case, each household is assigned a specific
‘‘within-household nonresponse inflation factor’’. The basic assump-
tion underlying this approach is that all income components in a
given household are affected by PUNR in the very same way—thus,
even if this were considered a pseudo-correction of the misreported
income level, the income portfolio of the household would most
likely remain subject to bias.
The incidence of PUNR and the treatment of this measurement problem
in major household panel surveys are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2. Incidence and Treatment of Partial Unit Nonresponse (PUNR) in Major
Household Panel Surveys
Share of PUNR (%)a Method used
British Household Survey
(BHPS)
10%-20%b Ignorancec
Canadian Survey of Labour and
Income Dynamics (SLID) 2008
7.2%e Imputation
European Community
household Panel (ECHP)
- Greece 0.5% Correction factor
- . . . . . . Correction factor
- Netherlands 10.3% Correction factor
German Socio-economic Panel
(SOEP) 2007
5.6% Imputation
Household, Income and Labour
Dynamics in Australia Survey
(HILDA) 2007
5.9% Imputation
Russia Longitudinal Monitoring
Study (RLMS-HSE) 2009
4.0% Ignorance
Swiss Household Panel (SHP)
2009
6.5% Imputation
UK Household Longitudinal
Study (UKHLS) 2009f
- General Population Sample
(first 12 months of first
wave only)
18% Imputationd
- Ethnic minority boost
sample (first 12 months of first
wave only)
29% Imputationd
European Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) 2007
- Belgium 0.7% Imputation
- Estonia 0.8% Imputation
- France 0.6% Imputation
- Cyprus 0.2% Imputation
- Lithuania 0,3% Imputation
- Austria 0.4% Imputation
- Germany 0.4% Correction factor
- Greece 0.6% Correction factor
- Spain 0.7% Correction factor
- Latvia 1.8% Correction factor
- Portugal 0.4% Correction factor
- Slovakia 1.5% Correction factor
(continued)
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The Imputation Strategy
The imputation procedure correcting for income missing because of PUNR
is based on the following principles: First, we impute the most detailed
income information possible (i.e., different components of income) to sup-
port augmented income analyses. Second, we employ longitudinal informa-
tion, if available, to control for otherwise unobserved heterogeneity and—
most important from the panel perspective—to support longitudinal analysis
of income and poverty dynamics. Third, we make use of household context
data and in particular household-level income data to control for potential
nonrandom mechanisms of PUNR.
Table 2. (continued)
Share of PUNR (%)a Method used
- Poland 6.0% Ignorance
- Czech Republic – Elimination
- Ireland – Elimination
- Italy – Elimination
- Luxembourg – Elimination
- Hungary – Elimination
- United Kingdom – Elimination
- Denmark – Elimination
- Netherlands – Elimination
- Slovenia – Elimination
- Finland – Elimination
- Sweden – Elimination
- Iceland – Elimination
- Norway – Elimination
For information only: Survey of
Health and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE)
- Denmark 7.0% Imputation
. . . . . . Imputation
- Spain 26.2% Imputation
Source: Authors illustration based on Bastien et al. (2010), European Communities (2003),
Hayes and Watson (2009), Jenkins (2010) and Eurostat (2010: 31).
a. As a share of all eligible adult respondents.
b. Measured at the household level
c. PUNR is not considered in the construction of net income variables (Jenkins 2010).
d. Only aggregated household level information will be imputed.
e. Share of respondents of labour questions only.
f. The relative high share of PUNR is the result of a strict regulated fieldwork period.
– = not available.
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Imputation of single income categories. As is standard in the welfare eco-
nomics literature, our target income measure is annual postgovernment
income of the previous year, which is given by the sum of all market
incomes (from labor, capital, and private transfers) plus pensions and public
and private transfers received minus taxes and social security contributions,
aggregated across all household members.7 However, instead of imputing
just a ‘‘lump sum’’ of missing income, we aim at imputing six individual
gross income components that are directly compatible with the more
detailed information collected in the standard SOEP questionnaire every
year.8 This allows aggregation at the household as well as the tax unit level
to match the very same income aggregates for all individual observations,
whether PUNR or successfully interviewed.9 This aids in the final simula-
tion of direct taxes and social security contributions, which explicitly
requires considering the interdependence of income and tax calculations for
joint tax filers. In so doing, we can derive a consistent measure of ‘‘house-
hold postgovernment income’’ as the major source for inequality analyses.
Finally, this procedure is likely to exert less bias in portfolio analyses than a
‘‘lump sum’’ or ‘‘flat factor’’ approach would.
For each PUNR, we impute the following six income components, which
are collected at the individual level in the SOEP (all other income compo-
nents such as means-tested public transfers and capital income are surveyed
at the household level and, thus, by definition, are already included in the
income measures derived from the successfully interviewed household
members):
1. Labor income (the sum of all incomes from dependent employment,
self-employment, secondary jobs, including extra pay such as
Christmas or discretionary bonuses, etc.)
2. Pensions (the sum of all pensions received from the statutory social
security pension system (GRV) as well as from the tax-financed pen-
sion system for civil servants, including any survivor benefits in both
systems)
3. Unemployment compensation (the sum of assistance received
through the unemployment insurance scheme, unemployment assis-
tance, and subsistence allowance from the labor office)
4. (Public) student aid
5. (Public) maternity leave benefits
6. Private transfers (including alimony)
102 Sociological Methods & Research 41(1)
Imputation of income received and amount received. For each of the compo-
nents mentioned above, we employ a two-step imputation procedure. First,
we need to impute a ‘‘filter’’ indicating whether a given person received the
respective component, and conditional on predicted receipt, we need to
impute a positive value for that income.10 In both cases, we make use of
longitudinal information, if at all available, which has been shown to clearly
improve the quality of imputation (see, e.g., Spiess and Goebel 2003 using
ECHP, Starick and Watson 2007 using HILDA, Frick and Grabka 2010
using SOEP, HILDA, and British Household Survey data). We separate all
observations with PUNR into four groups, depending on the availability of
information from the previous or following year, from both years, or from
neither. In fact, for any PUNR with missing information in year t and a suc-
cessful interview in t-1, we can derive valuable and highly predictive infor-
mation for the target information in t from previous year’s income receipt at
the time of the interview when he or she was asked about his or her current
income and employment status.
As such, receipt of a given income Yk . 0 (k = six income components)
is predicted on the basis of a multivariate probit model estimating the prob-
ability of income receipt in the observed population. For observations with-
out any longitudinal information, we employ only contemporary control
variables including individual information on sex, age, relationship to the
household head,11 and a range of household context information.12 For
observations with such longitudinal data, we also include income and
employment status from the adjacent waves. While longitudinal informa-
tion, if available, allows us to account for otherwise unobserved heterogene-
ity, we are also able to make use of the net monthly household income
(‘‘income screener’’) provided at the household level. In conjunction with
the reported individual income information from successfully interviewed
household members, this information allows us to infer the magnitude of
missing personal income. Hence, by employing this and other relevant
household-level information in the regressions, we are able to account for
nonrandom, that is, endogenous nonresponse behavior.
If the predicted probability for receipt of a given income exceeds a ran-
domly chosen threshold (drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0.5
and standard deviation 0.2 to consider uncertainty of the underlying imputa-
tion process), we assign a value of one to the respective filter indicator.13 To
adequately control for the interdependency of income receipt, we include
predicted filter dummies in subsequent regressions in the following order.
We first estimate the probability for receipt of pensions, then include the
predicted pension dummy in the estimation for the receipt of unemployment
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assistance. Both of these are then considered when running the probit regres-
sions for maternity leave benefits and student grants. All four filter dummies
are then included in the regression of received private transfers, and finally
we use all five filter variables to predict receipt of labor income.14 It should
be noted that the predictive power of these models is very high, especially
when introducing longitudinal data: For example, the pseudo-R2 for estimat-
ing the probability of receiving labor income ranges up to .7.
In a second step, we predict the amount of income conditional on pre-
dicted receipt as indicated in the filter variables. Here, we again make use
of longitudinal data in the imputation process by applying the row-and-
column imputation as described in Little and Su (1989; hereafter L&S).15
The L&S technique takes advantage of cross-sectional as well as longitudi-
nal information—using income data from a seven-year (or wave) shifting
window around the point in time with the missing data—up to three years
before and after the occurrence of PUNR. Assuming that information
obtained from observations more distant from the missing data point is less
strongly correlated to the missing information, we assign decreasing weights
to more widely separated information.16
The row-and-column procedure proposed by L&S is carried out as fol-
lows: The column effect cj is defined by the relative cross-sectional annual
income for each of the seven (k) waves of our shifting window, thus captur-
ing simple period effects: cj = Yj=
1
k
Pk
i= 1
Yi (with Yj denoting total incomes at
wave j and k being seven years). Second, the row effect ri is based on the
longitudinal income data collected from a given individual i; thus, it gives
the within-person average income position ri =
1
k
Pk
j= 1
Yij
cj
(with k denoting the
number of valid income values for individual i and Yj denoting the average
income at wave j and cj the simple wave correction from the column
effect).17 Multiplying the column effect cj with the row effect ri yields the
expected income position of individual i at wave j: Eij = ri * cj. Finally, all
individuals are ordered by ri and a stochastic component is introduced by
considering the deviation of the expected and the observed value from the
nearest neighbor with valid information in the respective wave. Combining
those three effects yields an estimate for the missing income Zij = Eij * [Ynj
/ Enj] (with Ynj and Enj denoting the observed and the expected income of
the individual n, defined as the nearest neighbor of individual i).
This procedure provides imputed values for all PUNRs with at least one
valid interview within the seven-year window under investigation; however,
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it fails to do so if no longitudinal data are available. This applies to less than
one third of all PUNRs and thus requires the application of a purely cross-
sectional imputation strategy for the various income components, some of
which are closely linked to the life course, such as student aid, maternity
benefits, and pensions. Conditional on the predicted receipt, we impute the
money metric value for the six income components, partly also separately
by gender. Again, to control for eventual interdependence in receipt of the
various income sources, the list of regressors includes the full set of dum-
mies for receipt of the other (five) components, as well as the same set of
variables used to predict the filter information. To preserve variation when
predicting the respective income value for PUNRs, we again introduce a
stochastic component drawn randomly from the residuals of the regression
sample to avoid a regression-to-the-mean effect when making use of stan-
dard ordinary least squares regression and to retain the original variance of
the income data (Copas 1997).
Results of the imputation process. A straightforward assessment of the
overall impact of these imputation procedures is given in Figures 4a–4c pre-
senting time series information on a comparison of observed and fully
imputed values for the various income components. We show (a) the popu-
lation share holding a given component, (b) mean values for each compo-
nent (in nominal euros) conditional on receipt, and (c) the resulting mean
values for the entire population.
According to Figure 4a and in line with the regression results on the
selectivity of PUNR presented above (Table 1), nonparticipating individuals
are being assigned labor incomes clearly more often than is true among the
observed population. In fact, our imputation procedures impute labor
incomes for roughly 75 percent of all individuals with PUNR, while only
60 percent to 70 percent of the observed individuals report receipt of labor
income throughout the previous year. Accordingly, the share of individuals
for whom we imputed receipt of any other income components (pensions,
unemployment benefits, maternity benefits, student grants, private transfers)
is clearly below the level among the successfully interviewed population.
Comparing the levels of income for those who have been either observed
or imputed as recipients of a given income component (see Figure 4b), we
differentiate between individuals where we could apply the longitudinal
imputation according to Little and Su (1989) and those where a purely
cross-sectional approach was necessary because of lacking longitudinal
information. By and large, for all income components, both types of imputa-
tion yield similar average values—except for labor income, where we can
identify a consistently higher average income among the longitudinally
Frick et al. 105
imputed individuals. This may partly reflect a statistical artifact since for
new entrants into the labor market, who typically have rather low earnings,
we do not observe any previous income receipt of a type that requires apply-
ing the L&S imputation procedure.
Finally, Figure 4c gives the average values for the various components
across the entire population before and after full imputation. While the gen-
eral result appears to be that our imputation does not alter the values very
much, one should keep in mind that these figures also pertain to all fellow
household members affected by PUNR because of the pooling and sharing
assumption underlying the calculation of an equivalent household income.
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Figures 4. The impact of imputation: Population share holding income
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Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)v24, authors’ calculations.
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Thus, before carrying out the welfare analyses, we need to incorporate
the relevant imputed gross income components into the simulation of direct
taxes and social security contributions, then add any public transfers, and
finally recalculate a PUNR-adjusted measure of postgovernment income.
Intermediate Conclusions and Hypotheses
What impact might the choice of one of the alternative treatments (ignor-
ance, adjustment, elimination, imputation) exert on results of inequality and
poverty analyses based on micro data affected by PUNR? First of all, given
the secular trend toward an increasing incidence of PUNR over time (see
Figure 1 above), one should expect any bias (in measures of inequality, pov-
erty, intrahousehold distribution, and aggregates) arising from PUNR to be
increasing over time, that is, with the duration of the panel. Second, the
selectivity of PUNR as shown above clearly challenges the basic assump-
tion underlying the various approaches: Version 1 ‘‘ignoring PUNR’’ (thus
assuming Y[PUNR] = 0) appears the least plausible given that PUNR is
more prominent among economically active household members. In princi-
ple, this critique also applies to the basic assumption underlying Version 2,
‘‘adjusting equivalence scale,’’ where we assume the incomes and needs of
the nonparticipating members to mirror those of their fellow household
members who were interviewed (Y[PUNRs] ~ Y[noPUNRs] within PUNR-
HH). Finally, there may be no clear-cut answer about distributional effects
arising from choosing Version 3 ‘‘elimination and reweighting’’ (i.e.,
incomes of PUNR households are equal to those of non-PUNR households,
Y[PUNR-HH] ~ Y[noPUNR-HH]) or Version 4 ‘‘imputation of PUNR’’
(Y[PUNR] = f[X]+ e). It can be assumed, however, that the more similar
the variables used in the reweighting scheme and in the imputation proce-
dure are, the more similar the treatment effects on inequality and poverty
will be. In any case, while both approaches appear clearly less normative
than Approaches 1 and 2 because of (adequately) controlling for selectivity,
the imputation approach should be chosen for four reasons: First, imputation
retains the complete panel population, thus making the data easier for less
experienced data users to handle. Second, by preserving the complete popu-
lation, imputation should also lead to lower standard errors than is the case
with reweighting approaches, which usually reduce efficiency. Third, only
the imputation procedure is capable of accounting for random as well as
nonrandom mechanisms of nonresponse. Fourth, and most important for a
panel survey, the imputation procedure facilitates mobility research.
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Empirical Analyses: Inequality and Mobility Effects
The following empirical analyses are based on annual postgovernment
income received in the calendar year preceding the survey year (including a
measure of net imputed rent; see Frick and Grabka 2003). For cross-
temporal comparability, we express all incomes in 2000 prices, also correct-
ing for regional purchasing power differences between East and West
Germany up to the mid-1990s. To adjust for different income needs across
households because of differences in size and age composition, we apply
the modified Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
equivalence scale, assuming adult household members (older than 14) to
have 50 percent of an adult’s income needs and children up to age 14 to
have 30 percent of those needs. In the following, we compare results
obtained from the four approaches to deal with PUNR on measures of
income inequality, poverty, and mobility. With respect to poverty measures,
we also not only try to identify the degree to which results coincide for the
entire population but also look at the consistency of those alternatively
derived measures for each individual. Here, it will be important to find out
not only whether the two approaches yield, for example, a similar share of
individuals at risk of relative income poverty but also whether these results
are identical for the very same persons.
To provide a more robust picture, we apply a range of established indica-
tors used in the literature. We measure income inequality by means of the
Gini coefficient, the mean log deviation, which is more sensitive to changes
at the lower end of the income distribution, and the top-sensitive half-
squared coefficient of variation. Relative income poverty is measured based
on a poverty threshold of 60 percent of the median. To also identify even-
tual effects within the population defined as poor, we make use of the fam-
ily of poverty measures developed by Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984),
allowing the poverty aversion parameter alpha to take on the values of 0
(poverty risk rate), 1 (normalized poverty gap), and 2 (giving higher weight
to those further below the poverty threshold). Finally, and particularly
important for addressing the relevance of these alternative treatments for
panel research, income mobility is measured on the basis of the measures
introduced by Fields and Ok (1999) and by Shorrocks (1978).18
Inequality and Poverty
Hypothetical effects. What are the hypothetical effects of treating PUNR,
in whatever way, on income levels, relative poverty, and inequality? First of
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all, any explicit accounting for PUNR should yield higher incomes among
those affected by PUNR; thus, average incomes (mean and median) of the
entire population should also be subject to increase. Following from that, we
should expect an increase in the relative poverty threshold and consequen-
tially, the relative poverty risk among households not affected by PUNR
(and thus without a change in their PUNR-adjusted income measure) should
be higher than without PUNR-correction, other things being equal. Version
2 (adjustment) and Version 4 (imputation) explicitly yield higher equivalent
income among households affected by PUNR. Thus, for this group, one
should expect, ceteris paribus, decreasing poverty risk rates as long as their
increase in household income exceeds the increase in the national poverty
threshold.
In light of these two contradictory effects, the overall (net) effect of
PUNR treatment on relative poverty risks at a given point in time remains
unclear. However, because of the secular increase in the incidence of PUNR
over time, poverty trends might be affected as well. Most likely, however,
there will be effects on the sociodemographic structure of poor households.
Almost by definition, the increase in the poverty threshold will cause an
increase in poverty among those households not at risk of PUNR (i.e., single
adults and lone parent families with only one household member of respon-
dent age). Similar effects may be expected for households that bear the risk
of PUNR but that were nevertheless completely interviewed.19
How does PUNR affect income levels, inequality, and poverty? Putting num-
bers to those considerations, we now turn to a comparison of results from
inequality analyses based on the four approaches (labeled Version 1: ignor-
ing, Version 2: adjusting needs, Version 3: deleting and rescaling, and
Version 4: imputation). Figure 5 gives time series information on various
percentiles (P10, P25, P50 = Median, P75, and P90) of the respective annual
equivalent postgovernment income. Apparently, in the early waves of the
panel, when PUNR was a rather rare event, there was almost no variation
across our four measures. However, in line with the increasing incidence of
PUNR over time (see Figure 1), we observe a clear and consistent differen-
tiation: Across the entire distribution, the results for Version 1 (ignoring)
are, as speculated above, lower than in the other three treatments. These dif-
ferences clearly pick up over the course of time. Adjusting the equivalence
scale (Version 2), which implicitly means that incomes and needs within
PUNR-households are correctly specified by the observed individuals, also
controls only insufficiently for the underlying selectivity, whereas Version 3
(deleting and rescaling weights) and Version 4 (imputation) yield the high-
est income levels—while being very similar in scope. As can be expected
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from the increasing deviation between top and bottom income levels in
Figure 5, there is a secular trend toward increasing income inequality in
Germany, which has accelerated substantially since the turn of the millen-
nium (see Grabka and Frick 2008).
Figure 6 confirms this finding using various inequality indicators. More
important for our argument, however, we observe again an increasing gap
among the four treatments, with Version 1 showing the highest degree of
inequality (no matter which indicator is chosen), Version 2 yielding a some-
what lower degree of inequality, and finally Versions 3 and 4 producing—
once again in similar fashion—the lowest level of dispersion.
Finally, we present results on relative income poverty using the para-
metric family of Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) measures. Confirming the
hypotheses laid out in the Hypothetical Effects section, the results for the
poverty head count ratio (FGT0) in Figure 7 are highest for the Version 1
(ignoring), while Version 2 takes on a middle position, and reweighting as
well as imputation yield the lowest level of poverty risk. Again the devia-
tion is growing with duration of the panel, thus also reflecting the increase
in PUNR incidence. The difference in poverty risk rates in the most recent
years is up to two percentage points!
All these results are very stable using higher poverty aversion parameters
in FGT1 (‘‘normalized income gap ratio’’) and FGT2 (which gives more
weight to the poorest poor).
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Figure 5. The impact of PUNR treatment on the distribution of equivalent income
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)v24, authors’ calculations.
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Consistency of poverty ‘‘assignment’’ when using different approaches to tackle
PUNR. Obviously, there is clear variation in the overall level of relative
poverty at the aggregate or national level across the various techniques.
However, even if the results were more similar, it would not necessarily
require that the various approaches identified the very same individuals as
being poor. The results presented in Figure 8a and Figure 8b challenge the
consistency of the poverty measurement on the basis of the four approaches,
thus answering the question of ‘‘who is poor according to approach x, but
not poor according to approach y,’’ and vice versa.
In other words, above and beyond the sheer interest in the overall share
of people living below the poverty line, it is of utmost importance for the
design, application, and evaluation of social policy programs to know more
about the socioeconomic structure of the population affected by relative
income poverty. The effects of any such reform should certainly not just
mirror the assumptions underlying the approach to deal with PUNR in the
micro data used. If that were the case, for example, we would expect child
poverty to look different if PUNR were mostly a problem among house-
holds with dependent children, thus misreporting their income and making
them appear poorer than they actually are.
In Figure 8a, we restrict our sample to those who live below the poverty
line according to Version 4 (imputation). The time series graphs show the
share of those identified as nonpoor according to the three other approaches.
In line with the analysis results so far, there is a high degree of concordance
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with the identification of poverty in Version 3 (elimination and reweight-
ing), although the population used in Version 3 is more selective, as illu-
strated by the share of those missing from the analysis which accrues up to
about 10 percent of the baseline population. Clearly less comparable are the
results based on Version 1 and Version 2 which both show an increasing
deviation from the results obtained from the imputed data.
In contrast, Figure 8b is based on the population of nonpoor in Version 4
(Imputation); and the various graphs show time series of the share of those
persons identified as poor in Versions 1 to 3. Again, we observe a high
degree of similarity with the results of Version 3, while the share of those
eliminated in Version 3 is as high as 12 percent in the most recent waves.
The results obtained from Versions 1 and 2 are significantly less compara-
ble, and differences again are growing over time.
Poverty and Income Mobility
The analyses so far indicated a significant impact of the methodological
decision on how to cope with PUNR on cross-sectional results (inequality
and poverty). In the following we address the question of the degree to
which this is true for longitudinal analyses as well by comparing results
derived from the four methods with respect to poverty and income mobility.
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Figure 9 presents results from simple wave-to-wave poverty mobility
analyses, for robustness purposes averaging all pooled two-year balanced
panels over the period 1985–2007. For each of the four approaches, we
show the share of individuals moving into or out of poverty within a given
two-year interval. To better assess the impact of PUNR on poverty mobility,
we separate the population into three groups: those who were continuously
living in households not affected by PUNR in both waves, those who expe-
rienced PUNR in only one wave, and finally the group of people affected
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by PUNR in both years. Comparing the four techniques, the selectivity of
the population in Version 3 (elimination and rescaling) becomes apparent.
Indeed, one may argue that maintaining the entire survey population, that is,
including households with PUNR, may be more important for mobility anal-
yses than for purely cross-sectional analyses, a strong argument in favor of
imputation (Version 4) over weighting (Version 3).
Although the degree of poverty mobility in the aggregate does not differ
much across the four versions, PUNR households show much higher mobi-
lity rates, simply because PUNR in at least one wave increases the probabil-
ity of being poor because of understated incomes as shown above in the
Inequality and Poverty section. Results based on imputed data (Version 4)
still exhibit above-average mobility, in particular if PUNR was present only
in one wave. On one hand, this partly reflects the uncertainty of the underly-
ing imputation procedure (i.e., we inject variation by adding residuals to the
predicted incomes); on the other hand, we cannot rule out that the missing-
ness simply reflects ‘‘true’’ mobility, if the PUNR, for example, had been
caused by a change in labor market status of the respondent that interfered
with survey participation. If the latter were the case, then indeed the mobi-
lity results in Version 3 (elimination and rescaling) would be downward
biased.
Using the same data, Figure 10 gives very consistent results with respect
to income mobility over two years when applying the Fields and Ok (1999)
index. It should be noted that the results presented here are insensitive to the
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choice of the mobility measure; applying, for example, the Shorrocks (1978)
index (using the Gini coefficient) yields more or less identical results (avail-
able from the authors on request).20
Conclusions
Using 24 waves of panel data from the German SOEP, we find an increas-
ing incidence of PUNR together with clear indications of the selectivity of
PUNR. A major consequence of this phenomenon is a systematic downward
bias in the level and development of income inequality and relative poverty,
whereas income mobility will be overstated because of people moving into
and out of PUNR. Our strategy of imputing single income components as
well as including them in the estimation of taxes and social security contri-
butions appears to be an appropriate means to cope with both of these prob-
lems, thus guaranteeing a less biased measure of postgovernment income as
the empirical basis for analyses of income inequality and poverty.21 The
imputation of various components instead of just adjusting the ‘‘annual
postgovernment income measure’’ (e.g., by means of a ‘‘flat correction fac-
tor’’) may also be considered advantageous because it supports decomposi-
tion analyses (by income source) and portfolio analyses while maintaining
the entire survey population (in contrast to alternative strategies that exclude
those affected by PUNR and reweight those at risk of PUNR). Finally, from
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a theoretical perspective, the imputation strategy outperforms all other
approaches because it makes it possible to account for nonrandom nonre-
sponse behavior. From a practical perspective, it enhances the usability of
the data, a matter of utmost importance to data providers.22
Future research will have to address the following questions:
 Is there a correlation between PUNR und subsequent attrition (UNR)
that would be relevant for mobility analyses?
 Does the choice of PUNR treatment affect comparability in cross-
country comparisons (see Frick and Grabka 2010 for the need to har-
monize the procedures used for the imputation of INR)?
 While our analysis dealt with the missing contribution of individuals
to their respective household’s resources, PUNR may also yield a
similar bias in other research areas, such as labor economics, where
the interaction among household members is of crucial importance—
for example, when modeling labor supply decisions of couples. The
missing mechanism for PUNR may not be random at all if the indi-
vidual is unable to participate in the survey because, for example, he
or she is earning a great deal of money drilling for oil on an offshore
platform, or simply because he or she does not want to answer ques-
tions while unemployed or severely ill.
 Finally, what do our results imply for designing incentives targeted
at increased participation in household panel surveys (see Laurie and
Lynn 2009; De Leeuw, Hox, and Huisman 2003; Hill and Willis
2001)? Instead of correcting the micro data after data collection, one
should instead try to prevent missing data from occurring. Thus, it
might be preferential from a data collection point of view to consider
ideas for early interventions, such as, first, collecting proxy informa-
tion on individuals with restricted interview capability, for example,
because of severe sickness, dementia, Alzheimer’s, and so on or, sec-
ond, increasing incentives to participate, for example, through mone-
tary incentives. While this additional participation may exert positive
spillover effects on other household members, it may also yield some
habituation effect from a panel perspective: Interviewees who were
paid extra money once may want to keep their ‘‘bonus’’ in future
waves as well, making this approach a rather expensive one. One
also can consider providing an additional incentive at the household
level only if all adult respondents participate (this is done in the
HILDA survey; see Watson and Wooden 2009). Third, an alternative
might arise with a short drop-off questionnaire to be filled in by
116 Sociological Methods & Research 41(1)
PUNR respondents to improve the basis for the imputation or weight-
ing procedure. However, as is the case for proxy interviews, such an
approach might also be used by respondents to ‘‘sneak out’’ of the
regular survey to reduce the response burden.
Above and beyond the arguments brought forward in this article, there
may also be other reasons why PUNR is increasing in prevalence over the
past few years than simply measurement issues. One argument arises from
the increasing number of individuals who have multiple residences, for
example, because of long-distance commuting between ‘‘home’’ and
‘‘work’’ or choosing ‘‘modern’’ lifestyles such living apart together
(Asendorpf 2009), that is, couples who do not share a common address but
rather live in two separate places. By making it difficult to determine which
household a given person belongs to and whether his or her resources and
needs should be assigned to just one or (partially) to several households,
these recent social developments make it ever more difficult to precisely
define the concept of ‘‘private households.’’
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Notes
1. This approach is in line with the unitary model proposed by Becker (1991),
which assumes a set of coherent preferences across all household members.
However, it should be noted that there is a substantial body of literature ques-
tioning the general validity of this assumption (see, e.g., Vogler and Pahl 1994;
Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen 2007).
2. For a comprehensive discussion of nonresponse behavior in household surveys
in general as well as in panel surveys in particular, see the various contribu-
tions in the readers edited by Groves and Cooper (1998), Groves et al. (2002),
De Leeuw, Hox, and Dillmann (2008), and Lynn (2009).
3. It should be noted that all of the following analyses refer to the population in
private households only, that is, we exclude individuals living in institutions
such as nursing homes.
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4. The contract with the fieldwork agency stated explicitly that in the first wave
households had to be ‘‘completely’’ interviewed with only a few strict excep-
tions allowed.
5. Without rescaling of weights, this approach is also known as ‘‘listwise dele-
tion.’’ It is well-known from the literature that such simple deletion of incom-
plete cases without any subsequent correction most likely biases the results and
increases the inefficiency of the statistics by reducing the sample size (see, e.g.,
Barcelo´ 2008 for the Spanish Survey of Household Finances, Frick and Grabka
2005 for the German Socio-Economic Panel [SOEP], Frick and Grabka 2010
for the U.K. British Household Survey [BHPS], the SOEP, and the Australian
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia [HILDA] Survey, as
well as Starick and Watson 2007, also using HILDA data).
6. See Nicoletti and Peracchi (2006) for a discussion of methodological problems
arising from the flat-rate correction in the European Community Household
Panel.
7. In line with the Canberra Group (2001) recommendations, we also add a mea-
sure of net imputed rent, which captures the implicit income advantage of
owner-occupied housing as well as any nonmonetary income advantage of sub-
sidized renters (see Frick and Grabka 2003).
8. Obviously, imputing missing income components is more complex than imput-
ing aggregate individual income. However, more detailed income components
not only offer greater research potential but also are needed to simulate tax and
social contributions accurately given the complexity of the German tax system,
with its various allowances and variable taxation of different income
components.
9. According to German tax law, married couples file their taxes jointly, while all
other individuals are single filers.
10. This two-step procedure is necessary to avoid imputing too-low incomes for too
many individuals (‘‘regression to the mean’’), in particular in cases of rarely
received income components like maternity leave benefits or student aid.
11. The quality of correction by means of imputation and weighting may crucially
depend on the available data collected on the missing persons by means of
proxy information (see, e.g., BHPS). A lack of such proxy data is not always
the fault of the survey designers but may simply result from ethical and legal
restrictions on the collection of proxy data on individuals who are unwilling or
unable to participate in a survey. In fact, in the German context and thus in the
SOEP, collecting proxy information on the income situation of nonparticipat-
ing household members is by and large not feasible. But even if the collection
of proxy information were allowed, one would expect a relatively strong mis-
specification bias arising from the restricted knowledge base of the reporting
individual with respect to the missing income information of the respective
partial unit nonresponse (PUNR).
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12. Demographic variables (D = dummy variable) include age groups, family and
household type, number of children, at least one household member is in need
of care (D), relationship to head of household, region, community size, SOEP-
subsample identifier, change in household composition (D). Social structure
variables include home owner (D), (highest) education of head of household or
spouse/partner, education of children, migration background (D). Income vari-
ables include net household income at month of interview, public transfers
(housing subsidies, social assistance, etc.), aggregated observed individual
incomes as a share of net household income at month of interview. Filter(s)
include considering receipt of other income components (D).
13. Using a static threshold of 0.5 for assigning the filter to either zero or one
would essentially ignore the nature of probabilities and result in biased pre-
dicted shares of individuals with or without the income component. Thus, we
use random thresholds. We fixed the mean of the randomly drawn thresholds
at 0.5, the default in probability predictions, and decided on a mean variation
of 0.2 around that mean.
14. The rationale for a specific order when imputing the six income components
follows their relative incidence. However, one exception is labor income.
Robustness checks altering the order of the imputation process lead to an over-
estimation of labor income, which suppresses the relative incidence of all other
income components compared to the incidence of the observed cases.
15. In an evaluation of various imputation methods, Starick (2005) argues in favor
of the L&S methods rather than the standard (single) imputation techniques.
Furthermore, the L&S methods perform better in maintaining cross-wave rela-
tionships and income mobility. This finding is also confirmed by Frick and
Grabka (2005) for the SOEP. L&S is also the standard procedure for imputa-
tion of item nonresponse (INR) on income questions in the SOEP (see Frick
and Grabka 2005) and HILDA (Starick and Watson 2007).
16. In more detail, the income information is weighted by 2^(3-dt), with dt denot-
ing the distance in years, ranging from 1 to 3.
17. Note that in the procedure implemented here, r is based on weighted income
information as described above.
18. All empirical results presented in this article are based on calculations using
Stata (Version 9.2). We gratefully acknowledge Stephen P. Jenkins and
Philippe van Kerm for their Stata add-ons INEQDECO, INEQUAL7,
IMOBFOK, FOKMOB, and SHORMOB.
19. To give an example, the head-count poverty rate (based on 60 percent of
national median income, 2007) for persons living in households with children
varies from 21 percent for ‘‘ignoring’’ and 19 percent for ‘‘adjusting needs’’ to
about 15 percent for ‘‘deleting and rescaling’’ and ‘‘imputing.’’
20. These findings for a two-year interval are confirmed when analyzing five-year
intervals. The lowest degree of income mobility among PUNR households can
be found when using imputed data instead of applying Versions 1 or 2, while
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‘‘elimination’’ of PUNR households from Version 3 yields the lowest degree
of mobility for the entire population.
21. Future extensions may consider multiple imputation (Rubin 1987), which would
also take into account the uncertainty embedded in the single two-stage imputa-
tion procedure applied here.
22. This raises the question of whether such corrections should be made by data
providers or by the users themselves. The main advantage of in-house correc-
tion is that data providers usually have more experience in handling ‘‘their’’
information and are also aware of the data’s shortcomings and potential restric-
tions. Another aspect is the availability of expertise in the field of (longitudinal)
imputation. Finally, data generation is time-consuming, which could discourage
users from working with these kinds of micro data. On the other hand, since
imputation is associated with normative decisions, transparent documentation
of the methods used and decisions made is crucial to ensure that users are prop-
erly informed.
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